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I. Introduction 
The hedge fund industry has grown substantially in the past two decades. In 2012, it reached a 
new record of more than two trillion dollars of assets under management. Many scholars have 
previously studied the survival models of hedge funds; however, the industry evolves quickly, 
and it is possible that the works published more than a decade ago might not be relevant today. 
In addition, given few has studied the survival models by using variables such as minimum 
investment, investment strategy, leverage, fund asset, management fee, incentive fee, high 
watermark, redemptions, lockup period, diversity firm, SEC registration, performance, and 
advance notice after the 2008 financial crisis, I would like to dedicate my research to fill the gap. 
Specifically, this research paper will examine the relations between hedge fund survival 
probability and the variables mentioned above, taking data after the financial crisis into account. 
The rest of this research proposal is organized as follows. Section II conducts a literature 
review. Section III presents the significance of the research. Section IV lays out the hypotheses, 
and sections V and VI explain the data and the methodology, respectively. Last but not the least, 
sections VII and VIII will show and discuss the results, followed by section IX conclusion in the 
end.  
 
II. Literature Review 
The topic of hedge fund lifetimes has been well researched. Using TASS database, Brown et al. 
(2001) find that hedge fund termination is a function of performance relative to the rest of the 
industry. They also discover that hedge funds have a half-life survival of 2.5 years. In particular, 
young funds die faster, which is a finding confirmed by Amin and Kat (2002). Howell (2001) 
observed that the probability of hedge funds failing in their first year was 7.4%, only to increase 
to 20.3% in their second year. This is easy to understand in the sense that new funds with a small 
amount of asset under management are likely to take on additional risk to enhance their returns 
and attract investors. Rather than using their reputation, they prefer to use performance to solicit 
investors. Brooks and Kat (2001) detect that approximately 30% of new hedge funds do not 
make it past 36 months owing to poor performance. Young funds that perform badly drop out of 
databases at a faster rate than older funds according to a study examining 3,477 live and dead 
funds during the period 1980–2000 (Jen et al., 2001). 
In addition, volatility and manager tenure were used as covariates. Brown et al. (2001) 
also finds that the attrition rate in hedge funds since 1994 was almost 15% per year. Furthermore, 
they find evidence that the probability of death increases with increasing risk, and that funds with 
negative returns for two consecutive years have a higher risk of shutting down. Once again, they 
group all hedge fund styles in aggregate, rather than investigating each classification separately.  
Moreover, Amin and Kat (2002) find that size and leverage have an effect on the survival 
of hedge funds and discovered that more than 40% of hedge funds do not make it to their fifth 
year, and the ones that did represented only 60% of the sample, confirming the results of Liang 
(2000). Boyson (2002) reaches the same conclusion, and observes that hedge fund size has a 
strong effect on survival that the smaller funds die faster than the larger ones. In the same vein, 
using the Zurich Capital Markets database, Gregoriou (2002) examines several predictors, and 
demonstrates that some variables can be useful to predict hedge fund mortality. It is found that 
size, along with redemption period, performance fee, leverage, monthly returns and minimum 
purchase have a significant correlation with the mortality of hedge funds, and this correlation 
holds the true for both live and defunct funds. More recent work by Gregoriou et al. (2009) 
shows that exchange-listed hedge funds typically are larger and more conservative than non-
listed funds. Compared with non-listed funds, exchange-listed hedge funds perform more poorly 
while having lower volatility. Listed hedge funds appear to survive about two years longer than 
non-listed funds. 
Some scholars also approach the survival analysis from unique angles. Bares et al. (2001) 
use a genetic algorithm and observe that optimal portfolio weights are influenced by survival 
times, allowing the authors to compare multiple prediction models. They also discover that 
hedge fund managers cease their operations without any prior notification as a result of extreme 
market events from which they do not expect to recover and continue operations. Boyson (2002) 
examines manager age, tenure, and SAT scores and finds a negative relationship between these 
variables and the likelihood of failure. Lee and Yao (2015) investigate the failure probabilities of 
hedge funds, by using both a proportional hazard model and a logistic model. Using a signal 
detection model and a relative operating characteristic curve as the prediction accuracy metrics, 
they find that both models have predictive power in the out-of-sample test. The proportional 
hazard model, in particular, has stronger predictive power on average. 
On a side note, numerous studies have also examined what correlates with hedge fund’s 
performance, which is linked to hedge fund’s survival (Brooks and Kat, 2001). Gregoriou and 
Rouah (2002) examine the returns of hedge funds and funds of hedge funds to determine whether 
the size of a fund affects its performance, and their findings suggest that the size of a hedge fund 
or a fund of hedge funds has no impact on its performance. Getmansky (2004) find that there is a 
concave relationship between performance and lagged assets under management. The 
implication of this study is that an optimal asset size can be obtained by balancing the effects of 
past returns, fund flows, competition, market impact, and favorable category positioning that are 
modeled in the paper. Hedge funds in capacity constrained and illiquid categories are subject to 
high market impact, have limited investment opportunities, and are likely to exhibit an optimal 
size behavior. Other factors that affect the lifetime of funds include lock-up period, redemption 
frequency, and downside risk measures. Simon (2011) investigates the causal effect of fund lock-
up period and fund lifetime and shows that the lock-up period variable should be treated 
endogenously. He claims that the lock-up period has protection power for funds in case of poor 
performance. Liang and Park (2010), in their analysis of predicting hedge fund failure, find that 
average hedge fund returns are related positively to incentive fees, fund assets, and the lockup 
period.  
 
III. Research Significance 
My paper researches on the hedge fund’s survival probability in relation to the fund’s asset, 
minimum investment requirement, investment strategy, leverage, management fee, incentive fee, 
high watermark, redemptions, lockup period, diversity, SEC registration status, performance, and 
advance notice requirement. Although there have been abundant research on hedge fund’s 
survivorship in the past, none of them has reexamined the issue by taking the 2008 financial 
crisis into consideration.   
The audiences of my research paper are scholars that are interested in hedge funds, hedge 
fund managers, investors, hedge fund consultants (e.g. investment banks), as well as regulators. 
Beyond filling the gap in academic research, this research will generate three broader 
applications. The practical application of this paper is 1) to help hedge fund managers and 
scholars develop a better understanding of whether hedge fund’s survival is correlated with the 
attributes mentioned above, if taking the 2008 financial crisis into consideration, 2) to help hedge 
fund consultants as well as investors understand what kind of fund might have higher survival 
probability and how they should adjust their decision-making strategy accordingly, and 3) to help 
regulators better understand the hedge fund industry.  
First, the research findings may help hedge fund managers as well as scholars who are 
interested in capital markets understand hedge fund’s survivorship. In reality, due to the 
management fee scheme, hedge fund managers almost always have incentives to raise more 
capital in order to charge more management fee as an important source of the fund’s income. 
However, it is possible that larger funds may lead to more difficulties on operating and investing 
sides of the business. On the other hand, it is possible that smaller asset under management 
potentially attracts fewer institutional investors as they may question why the fund manager is 
unable to introduce more capital into the fund.  
Second, it will help institutional investors make better judgment when evaluating which 
funds to invest in. In most cases, institutional investors will tend to pay more attention to 
investment strategy, portfolio manager’s track record, investment philosophy, research method, 
and risk management scheme, and few would take a technical standpoint to analyze fund’s 
survival probability. However, the survival probability will surely help investors make better 
judgments when they choose a hedge fund. The study will help them navigate the survival 
probability of hedge funds, particularly by taking financial distress into consideration.  
By the same token, hedge fund consultants (e.g. investment bank’s prime brokerage) will 
also benefit from the research. Many investment banks provide consulting services to hedge fund 
clients through the prime brokerage arm for free; hedge funds, in turn, bring in revenue for the 
investment banks by trading and/or financing through the relationship banks. Therefore, it is 
important for investment banks to pick the funds have the most potential to generate revenue for 
the banks in the future, and in this regard, survivorship becomes a very important factor in 
making the decision. My research will help the hedge fund consultants to interpret whether 
hedge fund’s survival is correlated to the factors being investigated in the research.   
Last but not least, from a regulatory perspective, the research will also help regulators 
understand the incentive of a hedge fund’s certain action. After the financial crisis, regulators 
have exerted extra amount of effort to promote better governance in the financial market. 
Therefore, it is helpful for the regulators to have a better understanding of the hedge fund 
industry. The result will be useful for them to monitor the fund’s survivorship in real-time.  
 
IV. Hypothesis 
Concretely, I will test two sets of hypotheses in this research: 
• whether some variables, individually and/or collectively, have statistically significant effects on 
the fund’s survival probability;  
• whether the survival probability model has changed after the 2008 financial crisis.  
 
V. Data  
This paper employs the Hedge Fund Research (HFR) database that includes funds that are US-
based and USD-denominated. The biases present in hedge fund databases are well documented 
in literature, and I take measures to mitigate them (see Liang 1999; Fung and Hsieh 2000). As I 
include both live and defunct funds in the analysis, survivorship bias is reduced. Out of the 65 
available variables in the database, I choose 13 variables that may be important to a hedge fund’s 
survivorship.  
Here is a list of all the attributes with definition and remark attached, if applicable, that 
are included in my datasets:  
  Definition Remark, if applicable 
Minimum Investment Minimum investment for the 
fund 
 
Main Strategy Primary investment strategy   
Leverage Specifies if fund intends to use 
leverage 
 
Fund Asset Total assets under Money 
Management firm 
 
Management Fee Annual management fee 
percentage  
 
Incentive Fee Annual incentive fee percentage   
High Watermark Specifies if fees are taken only 
after a high watermark (marked 
as yes or no)  
Defined either yes or no 
Redemptions Redemption intervals from the 
fund (i.e. monthly, quarterly, 
annually)  
Defined by number of days 
Lockup Lockup interval (length of time 
that new investor cannot redeem 
assets) 
Defined by number of days 
Is Diversity Firm Whether the fund belong to a 
diversity firm (i.e. women or 
minority-owned) 
Defined by either yes or no 
Firm SEC Registered Whether the fund is SEC 
registered  
Defined by either yes or no. Used as 
a proxy for fund’s size as funds that 
are larger than 100 million USD are 
required to be registered with the 
SEC 
Performance Historical rate of return  Note: I tuned this variable into 
geometric average return of historical 
performance 
Advance Notice Indicates advance notice, in 
days, required for Redemptions 
Defined by number of days 
 
Time Period 
This research uses data from two different time periods: September 2002 to October 2007, and 
March 2009 to April 2014. For the first time period, the reason to choose September 2002 as the 
starting time is to minimize the influence from dot-com bubble and stock market downturn, 
during which September 2002 is the lowest of point. I choose October 2007 as the end of the first 
period because S&P 500 peaked at that time. Therefore, 62 months of data are included in the 
analysis of the pre-crisis period. For the second time period, I choose March 2009 as the 
beginning period because the stock market started to pick up at that time. To make two time 
periods having the same duration, I set April 2014 as the end of the second period, which makes 
both periods 62 months. 
 
Cleaning and standardizing data 
First, I exclude the funds that do not have complete information from the data. Second, for those 
funds that have complete information but do not have concrete value for each variable -- 
showing as a range of value (e.g. management fee for certain funds is from 1 to 1.5), I take the 
average of the range to standardize the variables. Third, since lockup and redemption periods are 
recorded by using description rather than numbers, I convert all the associated information from 
verbal description to number of days. After these three steps, in the first dataset, number of fund 
is downsized from 5609 to 5390, while in the second dataset, from 4675 to 4621.  
In addition, I regroup the data for “leverage.” Since there were 11 categories under the 
“leverage” variable, I regrouped them into 5 levels: 1) no leverage, 2) 1-2 times of leverage, 3) 2-
5 times of leverage, 4) 5-10 of times, and 5) more than 10 times of leverage, which are 
respectively labeled as leverage0, leverage1, leverage2, leverage3, and leverage4. However, 
since there are only 7 and 26 data points for leverage3 in the first period and the second period 
respectively and only 3 and 9 data points for leverage4 in the first period and the second period 
respectively, leverage3 and leverage4 are therefore deleted because number of data points 
available is too small.  
Moreover, calculation for transferring monthly data to geometric average return is also 
needed in the data standardizing process. In the original database, historical rate of return is 
recorded monthly. Therefore, based on the information provided, I took the geometric average of 
these monthly return of each hedge fund as the indicator for its historical performance.  
 
VI. Methodology  
Since our goal is to build a model to understand what variables are important to a hedge fund’s 
survival probability, and what may have changed before and after the 2008 crisis with regard 
these variables, our final model is a standard logistic regression: 
 
Here each x(i) ∈ 𝑅𝑁 is an N-dimensional feature vector, where N is the number of variables in the 
final model; y(i) ∈ {0, 1} is a class label, with 0 showing the fund is dead, and 1 otherwise (i.e. 
alive); 𝜃 ∈ 𝑅𝑁 are parameters of the logistic regression model; and σ(·) is the sigmoid function. 
With this model fitted on both pre- and post-2008 crisis data, we could draw some inferences 
from there.  
Given the cleaned data, the next step is do feature selection. Two approaches stand out: the 
modern approach called LASSO, where it uses L1 regularization that controls the amount of 
shrinkage in the model to prevent overfitting. It automatically sets parameters of unimportant 
variables to 0: 
 In order to achieve best possible performance (higher accuracy, or minimum misclassification 
error), it is necessary to tune “lambda”, or 1/C in the above formulation, through methods such 
as 10-fold cross validation. 
 Another, traditional approach, is to look at metrics of model output: Adjusted R-Square, 
Cp, and BIC: 
  
  
  
Where d is the number of predictors, and ?̂?2 is an estimate of the variance of the error 
𝜖 associated with each response. Essentially, the Cp statistic adds a penalty of 2𝑑?̂?2 to the 
training RSS in order to adjust for the fact that the training error tends to underestimate the test 
error. Like Cp, the BIC will tend to take on a small value for a model with a low test error, and 
so generally we select the model that has the lowest BIC value. 
To ensure the variables used in the logistic regression are significant enough, I will only 
take those variables that are considered significant within the specific time period by both 
modern and traditional approaches. In addition, certain variables might need to be regrouped 
(recoded) into other variables within the same category of any of the levels drop from selected 
variables (more details will be given in the next section). Next, I will put the remaining variables 
into logistic regression in order to do inference (e.g. p-value). 
 
VII. Results 
Pre-crisis: 2002-2007 
Modern Approach - LASSO Model 
Followed by the methodology mentioned in the previous section, I start with LASSO model to 
identify significant variables, and here is the output from cross validation tuning the parameter 
lambda:  
LASSO variable output for pre-crisis period: 
  
In this table, if a variable is not followed by a number, then it is not selected in the 
regularized logistic regression by the LASSO model. From this output, we notice that lockup 
period, high water mark, event-driven strategy, and relative value strategy are considered as not 
statistically significant by the modern approach.  
 
Traditional Approach 
Criterion 1: Adjusted R-Squared  
Adjusted R-squared measures the proportion of the variation in the dependent variable accounted 
for by the explanatory variables, with a model size penalty. By plotting the graph of adjusted R-
squared and number of variables included in the logistic regression, we find that the highest 
adjusted R-squared value corresponds to a 14-variable model. This model indicates that high 
watermark should be excluded from the best model.  
 
 
 
Criterion 2: Cp 
In statistics, Mallows's Cp is applied in the context of variable selection, and a small value of Cp 
means that the model is relatively precise. 
 The graph below indicates that when the number of variables equals to 11, Cp has the lowest 
value. Followed by this conclusion, we pick 11 significant variables, in which high watermark, 
event driven, fund of funds, and relative value strategies are not included.  
 
 
 
 
 
Criterion 3: BIC (Bayesian information criterion): 
According to the output of BIC model selection, only 7 variables should be included in the 
logistic regression. The selected variables are advance notice, macro strategy, diversity, 
leverage2, SEC registration, incentive fee, as well as geometric return.  
 
 
 
Based on the outcome from both modern and traditional variable selection approaches, there are 
two leverage levels (leverage0 and leverage1) that are significant enough, and I recode leverage2 
into “high” leverage, and combine leverage0 and leverage1 into “low” leverage. Similarly, only 
“macro” level in strategy is statistically significant from other levels, and thus I recode all other 
levels in strategy into “else”, and only “macro” as an individual variable. 
Applying the modern and traditional variable selection approaches and regrouping 
variables, I put the remaining variables into logistic regression to do inference (e.g. p-value). 
From the output, indeed all variables are significant at 0.01 level.  
 
Post-crisis: 2009-2014 
Modern Approach - LASSO Model: 
I follow the same steps used to analyze the previous period, and graphs below indicate the output 
from LASSO model for the period of 2009-2014.  
  
 
 
Traditional methods: 
Criterion 1: Adjusted R-Squared  
According to the adjusted R-squared criterion, high watermark is eliminated from the model 
selection. 
 
 
Criterion 2: Cp 
Based on the Cp criterion, relative value strategy, high watermark, diversity, lockup period, and 
redemption period are excluded from further variable selection process. 
  
 
Criterion 3: BIC 
The BIC method indicates that number of variables should be included in the model is 5: 
  
 
 
In addition, by reviewing the results from both modern and traditional methods, I recode 
main strategy into “fund and fund” and “else”. Because the model only picks out “fund of fund” 
strategy as different from baseline, we regroup all other strategies into one baseline strategy 
called “else”, while retaining “fund of fund” as a second level in the strategy variable. 
Finally, I put the remaining variables into logistic regression to do inference with the 
output shown below. According to the result, we can see high management fee and incentive fee 
are negatively correlated with hedge fund’s survival probability, whereas ex-macro strategy 
(labeled as “main_strategyelse” in the output), being SEC registered, and good historical 
performance are positively correlated with the survival probability.  
 
As a summary, the variables that are identified as significant in two periods are not entirely the 
same, meaning the survival model varies from time to time, possibly due to certain change in the 
industry dynamics, the market situation, and the financial crisis, which I will further discuss in 
the next section. However, more than half of the significant variables from the pre-crisis period 
do remain significant in the post-crisis period, indicating there are some attributes, including 
investment strategy, incentive fee, SEC registration, historical performance, that have 
continuously played vital roles in a hedge funds’ survivorship.   
 
VIII. Discussion 
This section includes two parts: 1) discussion about the attributes that are identified as significant 
in both periods; 2) discussion about selected attributes that are identified as significant in only 
one period.  
 
1) Significant Attributes in Both Periods 
Main Strategy 
It is necessary to note that although main strategy appear to be significant in both periods, the 
significant strategy for the first period is different from that for the second period. In particular, 
in the pre-crisis period, a hedge fund’s survival probability is positively correlated with macro 
investment strategy, whereas in the post-crisis period, hedge fund’s survival probability is 
positively correlated with the “else” strategies (i.e. event driven, relative value, and macro). This 
finding is consistent with Fung and Hsieh (2001), who find out that empirically there has not 
been any evidence showing there is any single investment style that can consistently outperform 
its peers. 
 
Incentive Fee  
Incentive fee has correlation with hedge fund’s survivorship, based on results from both periods. 
In particular, high incentive fee is associated with low survival probability in both periods. This 
finding does not correspond to previous findings from scholarly research. For example, 
Gregoriou (2002) finds out that funds survive longer if they are large with high mean monthly 
returns, high performance fees, and low leverage, and this correlation holds the same for both 
live and defunct funds. It is reasonable that different time periods, datasets, as well as models 
used in research may produce different findings. In addition, the positive correlation does not 
hold as before may be because 1) the hedge fund industry has become more competitive from 
time to time, 2) investors might not think the high fee structure is as justified as before, 
especially a great number of hedge fund suffered huge losses in the event of financial crisis, 3) 
high fee structure may incentivize manager to take excessive risk, which would potentially create 
detrimental impact on performance in case of unexpected market events.  
 
Firm SEC Registered  
Since information with regard to fund’s asset is not completely available across the two datasets, 
I use “firm SEC registered” as a proxy for size of hedge fund. However, this proxy comes with 
limitation as the requirement to register with SEC was changed by the Dodd-Frank Act in 2012. 
Specifically, before the Dodd-Frank, funds can register with SEC voluntarily, regardless of the 
size; however, the Dodd-Frank Act requires only those hedge funds with asset more than $100 
million to register with the SEC, and all other smaller funds would have to register with their 
respective state regulator instead of the SEC. Since the requirement of being SEC registered has 
changed after the financial crisis (although before the crisis, funds that were registered with the 
SEC tend to be larger in size), there is limitation by using this attribute as a proxy for size.  
If we treat this attribute as a proxy for size, regardless of the limitation, it appears to be 
positively correlated with survival probability in both periods, indicating larger-sized hedge fund 
tend to have higher survival probability from time to time. This conclusion echoes with Boyson’s 
research (2002), which concludes that hedge fund size has a strong effect on survivorship and 
smaller funds die faster than the larger ones. 
 
Historical Performance 
Geometric average monthly return functions as a proxy for historical performance in this 
research. As outputs from both pre-crisis and post-crisis periods indicate, historical performance 
consistently has strong correlation with the survival probability (with large absolute value of 
coefficient and very small p-value in both periods). In the same vein, Gregoriou (2002) reaches a 
similar conclusion on the correlation between performance and hedge fund’s survivorship. In 
particular, he divides all defunct hedge funds into 10 classes, depending on their investment 
strategies, and finds out that 1) of the 10 classes of defunct hedge funds, none had significantly 
positive average returns in the 12, 6, or 1 month(s) before it stopped reporting its performance; 2) 
all of the fund classes had greater standard deviation of returns in the previous month than 6 or 
12 months earlier. These two findings both indicate that poor performance could be a major 
reason that funds become defunct. 
 
2) Significant Attributes Appearing Only in One Period  
Leverage  
According to the logistic regression output from the first period, hedge funds that have higher 
leverage tend to have higher survival probability before the financial crisis. However, such 
correlation vanished after the crisis, which may be explained by the patterns of the US stock 
market. Although in both periods, the US stock market had rallied for a long period of time, it is 
imperative to be aware that there were two relatively large-scale stock market corrections during 
the second period. 
From a previous research, it is found that other things equal, declines in stock prices are 
accompanied by larger increases in volatility than the decline in volatility that accompanies 
rising stock markets (Nelson, 1991; Engle and Ng, 1993). Therefore, it is possible that high 
leverage fund has not benefited as much from the bull market due to high volatility embedded in 
the market corrections. 
 
Diversity 
According to the HFR, diversity firm is defined as a firm that is owned by either ethnic minority 
or woman. Based on the logistic regression output, it is important to note that this attribute shows 
high correlation with a fund’s survivorship in the pre-crisis era, but disappeared after the 
financial crisis.  
Surprisingly, this is an attribute that not many scholars have studied on, but insights from 
the industry may offer an alternative way to explain this correlation. According to a journal on 
affirmative investing issued by Barclays (2011), it is found that 1) the appetite for women and 
minority owned hedge funds appears to be growing; 2) the number of women and minority 
owned hedge fund launches increased from 2006 to 2008, but has retrenched in 2009 and 2010, 
probably due to the economic meltdown; 3) although women and minority owned hedge fund 
firms tend to be smaller (median $65 million assets under management) and younger than their 
non-diversity peers, their performance, both in terms of absolute returns and risk-adjusted 
returns, is substantially stronger than the hedge fund universe at large; 4) risk aversion, while 
academically noted in women investors, seems to play a role in capital preservation, with women 
and minority owned funds outperforming their non-diversity peers in market downturns.  
 
Management Fee 
The logistic regression output indicates that low management fee is associated with high survival 
probability, whereas this relationship was not manifested before the crisis. A few possible 
reasons for this result are largely similar to the ones that have been discussed in the incentive fee 
section.   
 
IX. Conclusion 
In this research, I take a statistical approach to find whether some variables, individually and/or 
collectively, have statistically significant effects on the fund’s survival probability and whether 
the survival probability model has changed after the financial crisis. I find out that 1) the 
variables that are identified as significant in two periods are not entirely the same, meaning the 
survival model may vary from time to time; 2) although significant variables for each period are 
not the same, there are some variables, including incentive fee, historical performance, and SEC 
registration status have tested to be consistently correlated with hedge funds’ survival 
probability. 
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